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THE FACTS VS. THE THEORY OF FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATES
Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in 1973, orthodox economists
have promoted the conventional view that freely fluctuating exchange rates in a
laissez-faire market system are efficient. Every well trained mainstream economist,
whose work is logically consistent with classical theory “knows” that the beneficial
effects of a freely flexible exchange rate are:
1. the impossibility of any one country running a persistent balance of pay-
ments deficit;
2. that each nation may pursue monetary and fiscal policies for full employ-
ment without inflation independent of the economic situation of its trading
partners;1 and
3. that the flow of capital will be from the rich creditor (developed) nations to
the poor debtor (less-developed) nations. This international capital flow from
rich to poor nations depends on a classical belief in the universal “law of
variable proportions” that determines the real return to both the capital and
labor factors of production. Since rich countries have larger capital-to-labor
ratios than poor nations, the law of variable proportions indicates that the
real return to capital should be higher in the poor nations where capital is
relatively more scarce. Capital, therefore, should flow into the poor nation
until the return on capital is equal in each country. The effect of this hypo-
thetical classical international capital flow is to encourage more rapid devel-
opment of the lesser-developed countries and, in the long run, a more equi-
table global distribution of income and wealth2 and a convergence of growth
rates among all the nations in the global economy.
Since, in classical theory, capital earns a higher return where it is relatively
more scarce, investment projects in poor nations financed by this hypothesized free-
market capital flow from rich to poor nations should generate sufficient sales and
foreign earnings for the lesser-developed countries to repay the capital loans. If one
believes this classical conventional wisdom, international capital flows are tempo-
rary3 and self-liquidating.260 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
The facts since the breakup of Bretton Woods are not consistent with these clas-
sical Panglossian promises. First, since the oil shock of 1973 and continuing through
the end of the 20th century, many Latin American nations and African non-oil pro-
ducing nations have experienced persistent deficits in their balance of payments.
Second, since the late 1970s, the major trading nations of the developed world have
been under increasing pressure to coordinate their monetary and fiscal policies. For
example in September 1987 the United States and Germany publicly clashed over
incompatible monetary policies. The great October 1987 crash of world financial mar-
kets followed. This frightening experience reinforced the idea among the central bank-
ers of the developed nations that if they didn’t all hang together they would all hang
separately. Third, in recent years, flight capital has drained resources from the rela-
tively poor nations toward the richer ones resulting in a more inequitable redistribu-
tion of income and wealth globally as well as within many nations.
FIXED VS. FLEXIBLE RATES AND ASSET HOLDINGS
In some “fixed” exchange rate systems, central banks agree to intervene in the
exchange market only after the exchange rate moves by a specified (but usually small)
percent. For example, during the 1980s, in the currency arrangement known as the
European Monetary System (EMS), France, West Germany, the Netherlands, Ire-
land, Belgium and Denmark pledged, at least in the short run, to prevent their cur-
rencies from rising or falling against each other by more than 2.25 percent.4 To main-
tain the 1980s EMS fixed rate system, the central bank of each member nation en-
tered into an agreement to intervene in the market to limit the movement of the
exchange rate.
The success of maintaining a conventional fixed rate system requires that the
public be convinced that the central bank that actively intervenes in the market has
adequate international reserve assets to “make” the market price. If the reserve hold-
ings of the intervening bank are perceived as being inadequate, the market sees
selling the currency that is being defended as a “one-way” bet to success. The only
defense against this situation requires the willingness of foreigners or international
agencies such as the IMF to lend reserves to the besieged central bank.5 Almost
always such loans come with strings attached that depress the domestic real economy.
In most fixed exchange rate systems, there is, of course, a modicum of flexibility
within a small range around the fixed rate before any central banks step in to inter-
vene. Even under the gold standard, exchange rates could fluctuate by a few percent-
age points between the gold export point and the gold import point. In the normal
course of events, slight imbalances in trade due to seasonality, random causes, varia-
tions in stockpiling, or phases of the business cycle can cause some oscillations in
international payment inflows and outflows. These variations will affect the spot
market demand and supplies of the currencies of the trading partners leading to
some weakening of the exchange rate for nations running a payments deficit. If the
public perceives this weakening as a temporary aberration, a spot rate decline will
provide profit opportunities for comptrollers of multinational corporations (and oth-
ers who engage in international trade and finance). If the weakening is temporary261 ARE FIXED EXCHANGE RATES THE PROBLEM?
then buying more of the weaker currency to hold and selling some of their holdings of
the stronger currency will generate a profit when the temporary aberration is over
and the exchange rate reverts back to its “normal” price. These portfolio transactions
create market forces that tend to move the price back toward the original fixed ex-
change rate after the “temporary” decline.
The rationale for these profitable portfolio transactions is easily illustrated. Sup-
pose currency A’s exchange rate declines by 1 percent. The comptroller of the XYZ
multinational corporation, knowing she has a contractual payment in terms of A’s
currency in the near future, will have to decide whether to buy currency A on the spot
or at the future commitment date. The weaker the exchange rate compared to the
“normal” rate, the greater the incentive to purchase currency A on the spot. This will
mean substantial savings compared to the normal exchange rate as long as there is
complete confidence in the ability of the central bank to maintain the normal rate.6
Whenever an actual exchange rate movement is perceived to be temporary and
short-lived, the elasticity of expectations will be approximately zero. Market pertur-
bations that are expected to be temporary and short-lived set loose forces that re-
store the normal exchange rate with a minimum of central bank direct intervention.
In a flexible exchange rate system, however, if a 3 percent weakness of currency
A occurs, no one can be sure whether the rate will move further away from the origi-
nal rate or in the reverse direction. If international transactors are on average split
evenly (in terms of payment commitments) between those who think the weakness is
temporary (inelastic expectations) and those who think it will worsen (elastic expec-
tations), there will be no adjustments in the leads and lags of private trade pay-
ments. If the preponderant market view is that the current weakness in the exchange
rate is a signal of still larger declines to come, the elasticity of expectations is elastic.
The leads and lags in private sector payments will then tend to reinforce the current
decline.
Elastic expectations create instability and induce a process of cumulative ex-
change rate decline. As Hicks has noted:
Technically, then, the case where elasticities of expectations are equal
to unity marks the dividing line between stability and instability. A
slight disturbance will be sufficient to make it pass over to instability
. . . Thus even when elasticities of expectations are equal to unity, the
system is liable to break down at the slightest disturbance. [1946,
224; see also pages 205-206, 252-52, 264-66]
If there is a perception of permanent weakness in an exchange rate in either a
fixed or flexible rate system, the public’s uncertainty about the future value of A’s
currency tends to rise and the elasticity of expectations has a propensity to become
more elastic. The public will reduce holdings of transactions and precautionary bal-
ances of the weakened currency and substitute either other currencies that are per-
ceived to be stronger or other internationally marketable assets (for example, gold)
whose value in terms of currencies in which future contractual commitments are
denominated is expected to increase. This may induce others, including residents of262 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
the country, who are holding positions in assets in that nation with the depreciating
currency to fear the future and therefore execute a fast exit strategy to a perceived
safe harbor in another country. The resulting “hot money” outflow can cascade onto
the foreign exchange market and overwhelm the market maker.  The more flexible
the exchange rate system is perceived to be, therefore, the more likely an apparent
weakness in a currency will induce perceptions of greater uncertainty about the abil-
ity of that currency to maintain its value relative to other currencies and the more
probable those private sector liquid asset holders will adopt a fast exit strategy and
abandon the weakened currency as running and reserve assets.
Individuals often abandon a currency for transaction and precautionary reasons,
and not necessarily for the prime purpose of speculation. They may have no idea
whether the market is properly evaluating the possibility of a further market decline
in the weakened currency, but they will sleep better at night if they transfer more of
their precautionary holdings to a safer liquidity time machine. Consequently, these
individuals may search out a currency that they think will be a safe harbor if the
market for foreign exchange becomes volatile. The resulting movement to other cur-
rencies accentuates the weakness of the threatened currency and fosters a fear of
further depreciation. This can result in a bandwagon effect until either some event or
some official pronouncement encourages individuals to believe that the winds of change
are moving in a different direction.7
In an uncertain world where unforeseen changes are inevitable, an announced
flexible exchange rate system must increase fear of significant exchange rate move-
ments for any given exogenous disturbance. This fear creates disincentives for long-
duration international commitments by international traders. It also encourages short-
term precautionary and speculative capital movements as expectations about future
exchange rates determine today’s exchange rate. Our current expectations about the
future are anchored only by conventions.
The essence of this convention—though it does not, of course, work
out quite so simply—lies in assuming that the current state of affairs
will continue indefinitely, except in so far as we have specific reasons
to expect a change. This does not mean that we really believe that the
existing state of affairs will continue indefinitely. We know from ex-
tensive experience that this is most unlikely. [Keynes, 1936, 152]
The existence of credible State-sponsored institutions “guaranteeing” continuity
and orderliness in economic markets will create expectations of stability in the for-
eign exchange market. Building such institutions positively affects the psychology of
participants in financial markets. If dependable stabilizing institutions are absent
from a market, expectations can become unhinged even by ephemeral (from hind-
sight) events. Spot market prices can fluctuate violently, or temporarily, and pause
at any value until the next agitating event happens. And violent volatility in the spot
price of any specific financial asset reduces the liquidity value of that asset and thereby
encourages a rush out of that asset and into others such as cash that are perceived as
safe harbors.263 ARE FIXED EXCHANGE RATES THE PROBLEM?
These psychological aspects of market valuations imply than an unconventional
fixed exchange rate system has a better chance of success than a conventional sys-
tem that requires the central bank with the depreciating currency to intervene by
selling its foreign reserves. In an unconventional system, the central bank with the
appreciating currency intervenes by buying the money of the nation with the falling
exchange rate until the exchange rate returns to its pre-agreed fixed rate range.8 If
for example, nation A’s currency rose more than 2.25 percent against the nation B’s
money, A’s central bank would be pledged to buy nation B’s money directly in the
market. By selling its own currency without a limit, nation A can ensure the ex-
change rate’s return to its agreed-upon fixed rate.
Despite the obvious success of such an unconventional system, it is unlikely to be
widely adopted because the nation with the appreciating currency has surrendered
national control over its outstanding money supply. Most nations fear giving up their
sovereign right to limit the growth of the domestic money supply, and this fear is
rationalized by the classical monetarist neutral money axiom. Consequently this vari-
ant of a fixed exchange rate system has rarely been discussed much less put into
operation.
Nations find it easier to agree on a conventional system where the central bank
of any nation with a declining exchange rate steps into the market and actively buy
its own money with its foreign reserves. If the central bank’s reserves are sufficient,
the exchange rate will be stabilized at the fixed rate zone. If, however, the central
bank runs out of reserves, it will be forced to withdraw from the fixed exchange rate
system unless the nation obtains reserves from other central banks, usually via
“swaps.”9
THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS AGAIN
The classical efficient market hypothesis is in direct contrast to Keynes’ belief
that a freely flexible market price system can generate psychological beliefs creating
volatility in market evaluations of financial assets, which can then violently depress
the real economy. The classical analysis avoids this possibility by presuming that all
relevant information about “economic fundamentals” regarding future demand and
supplies currently exists and is available to market participants. This information is
embodied in the historical market database and current market price signals, and all
rational agents make decisions based on this available information. Acting in their
own self-interest, rational agents will force the market to establish the “correct” equi-
librium exchange rate. Observed variations around this market equilibrium rate can
be attributed to random shocks that will quickly be dampened down by the alert
action of informed agents. In this classical explanation it is implicitly assumed that
the observed dispersion of prices around the calculated moving average (equilibrium)
price does not affect future trends by causing a significant volume of false trades,
bankruptcies, and other events that can rewrite the future path of the economy.
The widespread acceptance of the efficient market hypothesis has driven Keynes’
psychological liquidity preference approach to the formation of spot market evalua-
tions from most academic discussions of financial market performance. Neverthe-264 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
less, there is mounting empirical evidence of both a short-run and long-run nature
that behavior in real world financial markets is incompatible with the efficient mar-
ket theory. Shiller, for example, has examined the long-run relationship between
real stock prices and real dividends in the United States from 1889 to 1981 and
concluded that “the volatility of stock market price indices appears to be too high to
accord with the efficient market model” [1984].
If the efficient market theory is not applicable to real-world financial markets,
movements in exchange rates can generate their own momentum. Once rapid move-
ments in exchange rates become widely expected, any nation’s currency can become
subject to a “flight of capital”—a real world phenomenon without an obvious theo-
retical counterpart in a classical model. On the other hand, international flight capi-
tal is a readily understandable phenomenon if one uses Keynes’s psychological li-
quidity preference approach to financial markets. Flight capital is the open economy
model equivalent of a bearish surge out of securities because of an expected decline
in the spot price in a closed economy model.
In the absence of credible financial institutions whose explicit function is to main-
tain orderliness and limit the range of movement in financial asset prices, the elas-
ticity of expectations can easily exceed unity because a current unexpected change in
exchange rates can induce destabilizing views about the future. With the breakdown
of the Bretton Woods Agreement for maintaining exchange rates in 1973, central
banks had to increase substantially their holdings of foreign reserves and their ac-
tive intervention in spot exchange markets to achieve some modicum of stability
[Weintraub, 1981] in repeated attempts to calm the market’s possible fears. And if
that fails, the IMF is expected to step in to restore stability and orderliness.
WHO SHOULD “MAKE” THE EXCHANGE RATE MARKET?
Defenders of freely flexible exchange rates implicitly assume that a laissez-faire
market system must possess an equilibrium price vector that clears all markets si-
multaneously. Proponents of flexible rates argue that if only central banks would
remove themselves as “makers” of the foreign exchange market, private sector entre-
preneurs—presumably international bankers—would move in and immediately move
the exchange rate to its predetermined stable equilibrium value.
Market-maker international bankers are motivated solely by profit (as opposed
to nationalist pride or political myopia that, it is sometimes claimed, motivates cen-
tral bankers). These entrepreneurs “know” the exchange rate that maintains a gen-
eral equilibrium among all trading partners. If the original private sector market-
maker banker-entrepreneurs in the exchange market fail to find the “correct” ex-
change rate that eliminates persistent international payment imbalances, they will
face bankruptcy. Other international bankers, it is suggested, will spring up and do a
better job in identifying the correct equilibrium prices over time.
Of course, this orthodox view assumes that a stable equilibrium set of exchange
rates over time exists. Unexpected changes and the potential for bankruptcy by pri-
vate sector international bankers who make the foreign exchange markets are in-
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national bankers-cum-market makers or their customers would create discontinuities
that endanger all existence proofs of there being any stable general equilibrium set
of exchange rates. If bankruptcy occurs, it can be shown that no general equilibrium
may exist [Arrow and Hahn, 1971] and hence there is no “correct” equilibrium ex-
change rate for the market-maker to identify.
 Only if private sector international bankers who make the spot exchange mar-
ket can correctly and fully anticipate a stable future can the threat of bankruptcies
and the ensuing discontinuities that threaten the existence of a general equilibrium
solution be avoided. In an uncertain world, there is no reason to believe that private
bankers are able to forecast future economic and political events with fewer persis-
tent errors than central bankers and central government. Moreover only the latter,
with cooperative efforts among nations, can create sufficient liquidity to quell almost
any private sector liquidity shifts.
Even if a long-run equilibrium exchange rate could exist, why should profit-maxi-
mizing private sector bankers attempt to identify it? If these bankers believe that in
the short run the expectation elasticities of others are elastic, there is more money to
be made by swimming before the tide. For a private sector financial market partici-
pant the lure of making short-term capital gains by anticipating even ephemeral
fluctuations becomes paramount. As Keynes noted “life is not long enough;— human
nature desires quick results, there is a peculiar zest in making money quickly . . .
Furthermore, an investor who proposes to ignore near-term market fluctuations needs
greater resources for safety.” [1936, 157]
If there are private sector foreign exchange market-makers who attempt to main-
tain the long-run exchange rate in the face of short-term disturbances, these agents
will need more liquid assets as reserves than central bankers require under a fixed
exchange system [Weintraub, 1981]. Yet it is unlikely that, in the aggregate, private
foreign exchange dealers would find it either possible or profitable to hold more re-
serve assets than central banks do.
If there is a private banker who has sufficient reserves to swim against the short-
term tide and take a position in defending an exchange rate, and by so doing promote
the public interest, such a banker would be considered idiosyncratic or eccentric by
the public and his professional colleagues. As Keynes pointed out, the long-term in-
vestor, that is, the person who is not in and out for a quick turn of profit, is the person
who most promotes the public interest [by providing stability to an
otherwise potentially volatile system], who will in practice come in
for the most criticism, whenever investment funds are managed by
committees or boards or banks. For it is in the essence of his behavior
that he should be eccentric, unconventional and rash in the eyes of
average opinion [otherwise, he would not be swimming against the
tide of public opinion]. If he is successful, that will only confirm the
general belief in his rashness; and if in the short run he is unsuccess-
ful, which is most likely, he will not receive much mercy. Worldly
wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally,
than to succeed unconventionally. [1936, 157-58].266 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Private sector international bankers and multinational corporate comptrollers
are required each day to demonstrate publicly their ability to augment the “bottom
line” in each accounting period. When private sector bankers are entrusted with the
making of foreign exchange markets and multinational corporate comptrollers com-
mitted to park corporate funds in currencies that are expected to appreciate or at
least be a safe harbor in the current accounting period, these dedicated entrepre-
neurs will find it easier to achieve success by swimming in the lead of the tide of
public opinion rather than trying to buck the short-term currents.10 Under such cir-
cumstances instability rather than stability is likely to be the rule under any but the
most stationary of economic environments. A truly flexible exchange rate will not
have any private or central bank market-maker to limit short-term exchange rate
movements in the face of intermittent dashes toward fast exits and safe harbors
whenever a storm is expected. A flexible rate system therefore is unlikely to inspire
confidence in the stability of the current exchange rate except under the most static
economic and political environment. Or as Milton Friedman responded to me in our
debate in the literature “A price may be flexible...yet be relatively stable, because
demand and supply are relatively stable over time....[Of course] violent instability
....of a specific money would greatly reduce the usefulness of that money” [1974, 151].
It is comforting to know that as long as exchange rates remain stable or fixed over
time, there is no harm in permitting them to be flexible! As long as demand and
supply are relatively stable, who cares if exchange rates are instantaneously flex-
ible?
Fixed, or at least very stable, exchange rates whose movements are tightly con-
strained to move at most at a rate that is less than the rate of interest, is a necessary
condition encouraging entrepreneurs to engage more freely in international produc-
tion, investment, and trading transactions. In such a constrained exchange rate sys-
tem, those entrepreneurs who engage in many foreign transactions know that they
can store liquidity in either domestic or foreign assets with the full confidence that at
any moment they can, without suffering a considerable capital loss, convert a mar-
ketable asset into the standard in which their expected international liabilities are
falling due. Without the presence of a foreign exchange market-maker who is willing
to swim against volatile short-run tides even if it means incurring significant short-
run losses on occasion, orderly markets for foreign exchange cannot long exist except
for a coincidence of short-term factors that offset each other and create temporary
stability.
The trick of the entrepreneurial money economy game lies in the need to hold
assets whose expected liquidity value is relatively stable in terms of the same units
as future liabilities and future money costs of production. “The convenience of hold-
ing assets in the same standard as that in which future liabilities may fall due and in
a standard in terms of which the future money cost of output is expected to be rela-
tively stable, is obvious” [Keynes, 1936, 236-37]. In a world of uncertainty and unpre-
dictable changes, there can be no store of value over a period of calendar time in an
entrepreneurial economy, unless contractual obligations are fixed in some nominal
unit. Whatever the nominal unit of contractual obligation is, it has a unique role to
play in an entrepreneur system.11267 ARE FIXED EXCHANGE RATES THE PROBLEM?
In an entrepreneurial economy, “the firm is dealing throughout in terms of sums
of money. It has no object in the world except to end up with more money than it
started with. That is the essential characteristic of an entrepreneur economy” [Keynes,
1979]. In an open entrepreneurial economy where multinational firms daily deal in
production contracts denominated in different money units, the object of an ongoing
business enterprise engaging in these international transactions will be to end up
with more money than it started with— in terms of those monies in which most of its
future liabilities and production costs are expected to be denominated. Thus expected
stickiness of exchange rates over the life of the production period is a necessary con-
dition to encourage entrepreneurs to engage in long-term production and investment
commitments that cross national boundaries. And in a global economy, that is a nec-
essary condition for promoting economic growth.
The more flexible exchange rates, the greater the incentives to make “more money”
through financial currency speculation rather than through real production processes.
Flexibility per se tends to encourage expanding international capital flows relative to
production and trading payment flows. It is therefore not surprising to find that
exchange rate values are normally dominated by capital movements rather than
purchasing power parities since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods agreement. If a
fixed exchange rate system could be reinstituted and if the publicly announced rules
convinced people that central banks are immutably committed to defending the pre-
announced exchange rate, it would not be surprising to find purchasing power pari-
ties become more important in exchange rate determination in the twenty first cen-
tury. And then perhaps we could reproduce a golden age of economic growth similar
to the global growth rates experienced during the 1947-1973 Bretton Woods system.
NOTES
1. In 1968, Professor Harry Johnson wrote “the basic argument for floating exchange rates is so simple
that most people have considerable difficulty in understanding it.... a floating exchange rate would
save a country from having to reverse its full employment policies because they lead to inflation and
deficit” [The Times of London, 1968].
2. The Thirwall’s Law analysis suggests a tendency towards a more inequitable income and wealth
distribution. The facts support Thirlwall’s Law rather than classical theory [Thirlwall, 1979].
3. Apparently, classical economists do not conceive of “flight capital” as an economic problem. Indeed
naive classicists claim that those with wealth have the right in any circumstance to choose when and
where they move their reserves independent of the damage such moves may inflict on the national
and international economy. But all the rights of the individual always are, and should be, constrained
by the potential impacts on society that the exercise of these rights can have in particular circum-
stances. For example, no one would defend someone shouting “Fire” in a crowded auditorium as
indisputably protected under an individual’s right of free speech. In many circumstances, flight capi-
tal can cause more damage then yelling fire in an auditorium.
4. In the late 1980s, the United Kingdom joined the EMS but in 1992, a speculative attack on the
British pound forced the United Kingdom to abandon the European Monetary system.
5. In an unconventional system when the central bank with the appreciating currency intervenes, be-
cause the central bank can expand its own currency as much as it desires, it is not too difficult to
convince the public that the central bank will sell whatever quantities are necessary to preserve the
fixed exchange rate.
6. Those holding currency A and having a forward contractual commitment in terms of B will at the
same time be trying to revise their financial arrangements in order to avoid selling currency A for as
long as the exchange rate is weak. Those holding currency B and having a forward contractual com-
mitment in currency B will purchase money of A to resell for B at the commitment date if the trans-268 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
action costs of the foreign exchange market are less than the difference between the current spot
price of A and the normal price, as long as the normal price is expected to prevail at the commitment
date.
7. In September 1992, doubts about the ability of England to remain in the EMS led to huge movements
out of the pound sterling which the Bank of England was unable to unilaterally stop until England
abandoned the EMS and let the pound float. Later in the year when similar doubts were raised about
the French franc, the outflow was stopped by cooperative and decisive actions to support the franc by
both the German Bundesbank and the Bank of France. This cooperative effort alleviated fears and
kept the exchange rate between the franc and the Deutsche Mark fixed.
8. Since each nation can always create additional amounts of its own money, the central bank with the
appreciating currency can aggressively continue to sell until the exchange rate falls back to its pre-
agreed upon fixed rate. Very often this is done via “swaps” between the central banks in the surplus
and deficit nations. In other words, the surplus nation creates its domestic currency which it “swaps”
with a sum of foreign “money” created by the deficit nation’s central bank that is deposited in the
surplus nation’s central bank. The deficit nation can then use the swap to intervene in the market.
9. Often the ability to borrow is tied to the government’s commitment to depress the economy (in real
terms) to reduce imports and expand exports (in the hopes that the Marshall-Lerner condition is
applicable).
10. Those who place their beach blankets at the edge of the surf during mid-tide in order to have easy
access to the sea must surely know they will have to retreat in front of the advancing tide if they are
not to be inundated—even if they know that more than half the time they will remain high and dry.
11. Since the money wage contract is the most ubiquitous domestic forward contract in non-slave societ-
ies, the money wage plays a predominant and persistent role in the determination of employment
and the domestic market prices of producible goods.
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